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Abstract 
 
There is an aporia to finitude: if I am limited as a finite being, I cannot know what the limits of my 
finitude are, because if I knew what those limits are, then I would have transcended them. I refer to 
this aporia as the "hard problem of finitude," interpreted through Graham Priest's work on inclosure 
paradoxes. Here I offer an interpretation of François Laruelle's theory of the Philosophical Decision in 
terms of his attempt to resolve this aporia through his suspension of standard philosophy's form of 
ontological dualism. Next, I apply non-standard philosophy to the problem of religious pluralism, 
presenting a novel theory of "standard religion" and the "Hierophanic Decision" through a non-
standard reading of Mircea Eliade's philosophy of religion, and end by pointing towards what a con-
sistently performative and finite form of religious pluralism might look like from within the "democ-
racy-of-thought," here rendered as the "parliament of religions." 
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"Whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent" (Wittgenstein 2018, §7) 
"Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one has just contradicted oneself" (Priest 2002, 233) 
"[The language of the One] speaks what we cannot say, or speaks  
the identity-in-the-last-instance of saying and silence" (Laruelle 2013b, 227) 
 
 
There is an aporia to finitude: if I am limited as a finite being, I cannot know what 
the limits of my finitude are, because if I knew what those limits are, then I would have 
transcended them.2 With apologies to David Chalmers (Chalmers 1995), we may refer to 
this aporia as "the hard problem of finitude." As understood here, the hard problem of 
                                                          
1 Many thanks to Sally Brown, Nathan Jumper, Bryan Rennie, and Richard Young – all of whom 
offered comments and conversation on earlier drafts of this paper. Very special thanks goes out in 
particular to Jon Cogburn, whose commentary on the inclosure schema was invaluable. 
2 Both Hegel (1997, §60) and Wittgenstein (2018, §1) have offered formulations of this aporia. 
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finitude arises due to the transcendental fact that we always already presuppose some-
thing (let us call it "reality") prior to our conceptual determination of it. We find our-
selves in the midst of the fact that anything is at all. But we do not even know what being 
"inside" of reality means since we do not have access to it as a whole as finite beings or, 
by definition, to anything outside of it. Our finitude therefore not only underdetermines 
our ability to conceptualize reality in a well-defined way, but it also underdetermines a 
complete account of finitude itself. In this sense, we might say that the limits of thought 
are boundaries that cannot be crossed, but we do not even know what they are.  
This aporia also haunts religious pluralism. We may define religious pluralism as 
the idea that all religions are so many parts of a whole, whether in terms of reality, sacral-
ity, and/or truth. In other words, religious pluralism amounts to the idea that all religions 
are equally real, equally true, and/or equally valuable parts of some whole. Religious 
pluralism is aporetic because, if I claim equality with others due to our shared finitude, 
then I cannot determine in terms of what we are equal to each other exactly, for such a 
knowledge would put me in a position of epistemic predominance over them. It would 
put me in a "meta-exclusive" position outside of the plane of finitude, thus rendering my 
religious pluralism logically inconsistent. This charge of inconsistency is, in a nutshell,  
Gavin D'Costa's critique of John Hick's pluralistic hypothesis (Hick 2004), which makes 
religious pluralism an apparent "impossibility" (D'Costa 1996). 
Here we may remember the parable of the blind men and the elephant. In one ver-
sion of the story, four blind men are wandering in the forest when they unexpectedly 
come across an elephant, which none of them has encountered before. Each of the four 
describe the elephant variously as being like a snake (one holds the trunk), a pillar (one 
grasps the leg), a smooth wall (one touches the side), and smooth, thin stone (one grips 
the tusk). After quarreling, the blind men conclude they must have each been touching 
different animals ff because their descriptions mismatch each other. Of course, we the 
readers know how misguided this conclusion is. In certain retellings of the story, this 
epistemic benefit is shared with a king who, in order to make a point to his court advisors 
about pointless bickering, asks the blind men to his court to describe an elephant. Here 
both us readers and the king benefit from an optic advantage over the blind men – a 
transcendent, royal knowledge.  
Hick operates from this royal knowledge insofar as he uses the parable of the blind 
men and the elephant (Hick 1973, 37) to suggest religious exclusivism and inclusivism 
are false, and that all religions are really phenomenal conceptualizations of one noumenal 
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reality that transcends us all. But how can Hick claim both to be "blind" like everyone 
else and also to have an optic advantage? This is inconsistent.  
There are two other ways to imagine this aporia. The first comes from William 
Irwin Thompson, who likens the human condition to being that of a fly crawling across 
the ceiling of Sistine Chapel – a fly that cannot comprehend the images of angels and 
gods under its own feet (Thompson quoted in Kripal 2010, 159). The second comes from 
William James, who invites us to wonder whether we are not as cats or dogs in a library, 
surrounded by books we are unable to comprehend (James 1977, 140). Both scenes pre-
sent us with a difficulty as finite beings, for how could a finite being know the nature of 
its finitude or how it is finite? Neither the fly nor the cats and dogs could conceptualize 
their lack of comprehension, for then they would cease being flies, cats. And dogs. The 
aporia, then, is that we cannot know how we are finite precisely because we are finite. 
Any demand made that all knowledge is finite inconsistently contravenes those same 
posited limits of finitude. Every attempt to determine one's own position in finitude vio-
lates the very assertion of one's position therein. To determine one's immanence to 
finitude requires a transcendental perch, an "outside" of immanence, by which to deter-
mine as much. 
We may understand this aporia by applying Graham Priest's work on "inclosure 
paradoxes." Let us posit Ω, the totality of what is knowable, and x, religious knowledge, 
which is taken as a subset of Ω (just in case all of the propositions in x are knowable). 
Next, let us apply an operator, δ, to x, which is the contention that all religious 
knowledge is correctly construed pluralistically because all religious knowers are finite. 
However, if we say that the pluralist's contention belongs to the set of religious 
knowledge, then this demand should itself be understood pluralistically – as in δ{δ(x)} – 
which is a self-defeating proposition. So, in order to avoid this situation, an operation of 
Transcendence is required, which tells us that δ(x) transcends x. In other words, the de-
mand that religious knowledge be construed pluralistically is not contained within the set 
of religious knowledge itself. However, this demand still belongs to Ω (as described by 
an operation of Closure). An inclosure paradox arises, however, insofar as we apply δ(x) 
to Ω itself, for then δ(x) both is contained within (Closure) and transcendent of (Tran-
scendence) the totality of what is knowable. Said differently, if religious knowledge is 
finite and a subset of the totality of what is knowable, then the demand that religious  
knowable be construed pluralistically transcends the set of religious knowledge while 
nonetheless being an element of Ω. And yet, insofar as Ω is understood to be itself finite, 
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then Ω is subject to the demand of pluralization, dictating that such a demand is both 
within and beyond the limits of Ω. This is, I claim, the inclosure paradox at the heart of 
standard forms of religious pluralism.3 
As is well known, Priest himself affirms such inconsistency, declaring "the limits 
of thought are boundaries which cannot be crossed, but yet which are crossed" (Priest 
2002, 3). Priest is a "dialetheist," that is, he affirms the existence of some true contradic-
tions. However, if we are indeed like the blind men who, in the first telling of the parable, 
are wandering in the forest when they bump into an elephant, then we might say we do 
not even know what an elephant is in the first place. This means that both Ω are x are 
undetermined variables. What an elephant is, is precisely what is under question,  because 
here there is no king to tell us how it is we are blind or what we are all touching. In what 
follows, I offer a model of religious pluralism that operates from an axiomatic assump-
tion that we do not have access to royal knowledge, which dictates that we must think 
like blind men in the forest, a fly on the ceiling, a cat or dog in the library. 4 I thus attempt 
to formulate a consistently incomplete (that is, finite) model of religious pluralism, which 
does not devolve into aporia.5 
Given that some proponents of "polydoxy" present a theory of religious pluralism 
through Whiteheadian and/or Deleuzian models of formalized incompleteness (Keller 
and Schneider 2011), Elliot Wolfson's comment on polydoxy is relevant here. "Polydoxy 
is not superior to orthodoxy," he observes, "if the beliefs promulgated under the pretext 
of plurality regurgitate erroneous claims, as in the case of envisioning immanence from 
the standpoint of transcendence" (Wolfson 2014, 231). Wolfson here points to the consti-
tutive inability of many religious pluralists, despite the posited consistent finitude of their 
theories, to theorize pluralism in a consistent manner. For even if they treat the elephant 
as ontologically pluralistic or immanent in constitution, reflexive knowledge of this cir-
cumstance is still an inconsistent exception to finitude. For to have made finitude trans-
parent to conceptualization, to a transcendental knowledge of immanence, is a performa-
                                                          
3 See appendix A, §1, for a visual representation of Priest's Inclosure Schema. I am indebted to Jon 
Cogburn for helping me formulate this presentation of religious pluralism's inclosure paradox.  
4 I do not employ the blind men as an ableiest trope, nor the limitations of flies and cats or dogs in a 
speciesist way, but rather as figures emblematic of the universality of finitude. 
5 The term "consistent incompleteness," and its opposite, "inconsistent incompleteness," come from 
the work of Paul Livingston, and refer to the two options available to post-Gödelian thought insofar 
as Gödel demonstrated the impossibility of both a consistent and complete system of thought (see 
Livingston 2012).  
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tive contradiction. In this light, we may assert that regardless of whether a pluralist be-
lieves that the religions are so many blind men touching different parts of the same ele-
phant, as for Hick (Hick 2004) or various forms of perennialism (see Ferrer 2002:71-
114), or that there are many elephants (Cobb 1999; Ferrer 2008; Griffin 2005; Heim 
2001), the pluralist nonetheless maintains a position of royal transcendence: the king who 
can see and so tells the blind men what is really going. So is religious pluralism a logical 
impossibility? My claim is that it is impossible to maintain from within a conceptual 
idiom of thought, but not from within a performative (or non-conceptual) idiom of 
thought. My goal, therefore, is to develop a model of religious pluralism in a consistently 
performative, pluralistic, and finite way. 
 
A Kantian Interlude 
 
To think from within finitude: this is, essentially, a Kantian imperative, deriving 
from both a Kantian problem and a Kantian solution. The problem is that trying to deter-
mine the nature of reality as a whole leads to an antinomy. The solution to this problem is 
to be empirical about reality – to think from the inside of it. Kant himself proposes such a 
"empirical directive" (see Braver 2007, 53). He writes: the "I or he or it (the thing) which 
thinks… is known only through the thoughts which are its predicates, and of it, apart 
from them, we cannot have any concept whatsoever" (Kant 1965, A346/B404).6 Kant, 
however, cannot apply this directive to external reality, but only to the subject since the 
subject is transcendental for him. Reality is transcendentally correlated to the subject, 
dictating that all experience is phenomenal and never experience of the noumenal thing-
in-itself. This, of course, made Kantianism vulnerable to the Berkleyan/Fichtean argu-
ment against transcendence that it is impossible to think the unthinkable, and since the 
noumenal is unthinkable, we are not justified in positing it (see Cogburn 2017,7). This 
kind of argument ushered in German idealism, anti-realism, and then the supremacy of 
socio-linguistic constructivism in the 20 th century. However, what if we were able to 
bypass the Berkleyan/Fichtean argument? Then we would be free to apply Kant 's empiri-
                                                          
6 As Wilfrid Sellars describes it, "our concept of an I is the concept of that which thinks, in the vari-
ous modes of thinking. The idea that concepts pertaining to thinking are essentially functional in 
character raises the question: What non-functional characterization can be given of the processes, 
which embody these functions. . . . We don't know these processes save as processes which embody 
these functions" (Sellars quoted in Braver 2007:55).  
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cal directive not only to the subject, but to external reality itself. And then we could, 
moreover, revise the empirical directive and assert: reality, whatever it is, is known only 
through its effects, and of it, apart from them, we cannot have any concept of reality 
whatsoever.7 
Arguably, it is precisely this kind of imperative that energizes the work of 
François Laruelle, which, as I reconstruct it, offers us the means by which to bypass the 
master argument and operate from within finitude in a performatively consistent manner. 
 
Non-Standard Philosophy 
 
Laruelle himself does not describe his brand of "non-standard" philosophy specifi-
cally in terms of "the hard problem of finitude." But this is arguably one of the motivat-
ing conundrums underlying his project. For Laruelle takes as axiomatic that thought pre-
supposes and is transcendentally immanent to reality ("the Real"), prior to any determina-
tion of its essence from within a thought-world.8 And this dictates that thought is imma-
nent to the Real, and so the Real is underdetermined. In Priestian terms, Laruelle operates 
from a presupposed Domain (Ω: the generic immanence of the Real) and Closure 
(thought's immanence to the Real), but rejects any operation of Transcendence by which 
one could make the Real a well-defined object of conceptualization.9 To clarify, the term 
"Domain" is not here an ontological referent. The Real is not the "One-All," to borrow a 
term from Badiou's philosophy (Badiou 1988), and so is neither the totality of how every-
thing is logically ("the One") nor the totality of what everything is ontologically ("the 
All"). The Realis underdetermined . Laruelle's ambition is thus to humble any attempt to 
treat the Real as an ultimate reality or totality, thus staging a "de-ultimatization" or "de-
ontologization" of reality. Here Jon Cogburn's musings on metaphysics is illuminating. 
He comments: 
 
                                                          
7 Cf. Rocco Gangle who asserts that immanence, "roughly, names then any metaphysical position or 
method rejecting the notion that the ultimate structure of reality may be investigated independently of 
its real content in the way that Kant's, for example, does" (Gangle 2016, 3). 
8 "The Real," like "the One," is just what Laruelle calls one of the "first names" of generic imma-
nence, referring to that which resists signification in order "to evoke what is already-manifest for 
philosophy to even act" (Smith 2016, 43). 
9 See appendix A, §2, for more details. 
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Metaphysics tries to give us explanations of what reality must be like such that 
what we know about it is true. But suppose for argument that part of what we know about 
reality is the impossibility of providing an explanation of what reality must be like such 
that what we know about it is true. Then the metaphysician would have to provide an 
account of what reality is like such that metaphysics is impossible. (Cogburn 2017, 60) 
To provide an account of what reality is like such that metaphysics is impossible : 
this is a useful starting point for understanding Laruelle, because he precisely attempts to 
offer an account of what immanence (Domain) is like from within finitude (Closure) such 
that a transcendental determination of what finite immanence is (Transcendence) is im-
possible. Of course, Laruelle is certainly not alone in such an effort.10 However, what 
marks his project as qualitatively different than standard forms of philosophy is that he 
does not operate from a conceptual, but rather a performative  idiom of thought, treating 
the Real aesthetically. This is precisely why his philosophy may be said to be "non-
standard" or, as I put it, "non-dualistic." 
Admittedly, Laruelle does not (as far I as know) use the term "ontological dual-
ism" in his work, but this is just the sort of thing he describes in terms of the Principle of 
Sufficient Philosophy: that thought, in principle, is able to have knowledge of the Real a s 
a conceptual object. Laruelle refers to this Principle as the "Parmenidean" heart of stand-
ard philosophy, since Parmenides assumes a pre-established harmony, or isomorphism, 
between ideality and the Real. For standard philosophy, there is a "cookie cutter" shape 
of, or "perforated lines" around, reality. Or as Raimon Panikkar puts it in his own diagno-
sis of Parmenides, the Real "is Thinking, that is, Intelligibility—not certainly for an indi-
vidual mind, but as such" (Panikkar 2008, 119). In this way, standard philosophy func-
tions in terms of what Laruelle refers to – riffing on René Girard – as "mimetic rivalry" 
(Laruelle 2015c, 29). Here, thoughts are treated as so many competing representations or 
approximations of the Real. 
Of course, this Principle alone does not determine what the Real is. A Philosophi-
cal Decision is required, which may be understood as the operationalization of the Prin-
ciple of Sufficient Philosophy. For if the latter tells us that the Real is, in principle, given 
to thought, then the Decision tells us what the Real specifically is given as conceptually 
in terms of F, and how it is given as much. "Givenness" is a phenomenological term, 
                                                          
10 Cf. Cogburn on "object-oriented-ontology" (OOO) as operating from a suspension of the operation 
of Transcendence (Cogburn 2017, 60-90). 
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which points to the basic assumption of standard philosophy, namely, the Real appears. 
Specifically, the Real appears ontologically: as either being or its negation, non-being 
(Laruelle refers to this second term as "alterity"). Here "being" is synonymous with the 
conceptual object of what Heidegger refers to as "ontotheology" whereas non-being or 
alterity is the conceptual object of what Conor Cunningham refers to as "meontotheolo-
gy" (Cunningham 2002). Ontotheology operates upon a determination of the Real as 
something (a being), while meontotheology operates upon a determination of the Real as 
nothing (non-being). We might also refer to this dualism in terms of "identity and differ-
ence," for whereas ontotheology operates upon the presupposition of a univocal identity 
between thought and the Real (qua a being), meontotheology operates upon the presup-
position of an equivocal difference between thought and the Real (qua non-being). 
Standard philosophers thus assume their sufficiency to determine what the Real is 
conceptually, in terms of univocity or equivocity, and how they are able to do so episte-
mologically. This combination of "what" and "how" constitutes a dualistic condition-
ing/conditioned schema. For instance, in realist philosophy, the Real (the object of 
knowledge: ontos) conditions how thought (the means of knowledge: logos) has access to 
the Real; whereas in anti-realist philosophy, thought becomes both its own object and 
means of knowledge without reference to a knowable external reality, thus overdetermin-
ing the Real and reducing it effectively to non-being. (Anti-realism is, remember, the 
upshot of the Berkleyan/Fichtean argument against the noumenal.) Regardless, then, 
whether one treats the Real as being or non-being, either way, one assumes thought can 
obtain dualistic distance by which to determine the Real and so turn it into an object of 
knowledge. Here, thoughts are treated as so many competing representations or approxi-
mations of the Real, as either being or non-being (see Laruelle 2013b, 1999, 2003; cf. 
Smith 2016, 13-34).11 
Standard philosophers assume a dualistic, bilateral relationship between thought 
and reality: both that reality determines thought and that thought is able to determine an 
assumed previously existing, knowable reality back conceptually. In Priestian terms, 
thought is able to effect an operation of Transcendence by which to turn around, as it 
                                                          
11 Both John Milbank and Ray Brassier have critiqued the theory of the Philosophical Decision as 
only applicable to post-Kantian thought (Brassier 2007, 118-149; Milbank 2011; 2014, 101-2). Laru-
elle's schema is, indeed, not universal. However, Laruelle's significance is that he identifies the opera-
tional structure of philosophy insofar as it is conceptually dualistic – a structure that applies across 
many times and systems of thought. 
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were, and objectify the Real. As Laruelle puts it, philosophy "is always a decision or a 
transcendence" (Laruelle quoted in Smith 2016, 180; emphasis original). Or as he de-
scribes it elsewhere, "philosophy projects a reality in itself, which is to say, one that has 
been constructed in the realm of operational transcendence, within which it claims to 
intervene, and in terms of which it gauges all possible intervention" (Laruelle 2003, 183-
4; emphasis original). However, such an operation of Transcendence is inconsistent, 
according to Laruelle. He protests: 
The philosopher, legislating for reason, the life of the mind or social life, makes an 
exception even of the fact that he does not do what he says or does not say what he does, 
but, speaking the law, he makes an exception and enjoys the privilege of speaking about it 
and imposing it with his authority. (Laruelle 2012a, 230) 
In other words, when thought makes a Philosophical Decision (that the Real is 
best approximated by thought-world x), this constitutes an inconsistent operation of Tran-
scendence by which thought both is and is not contained within the Real. For insofar as a 
Philosophical Decision determines that some posited thought-world accurately approxi-
mates the Real, this Decision inconsistently both belongs to and transcends the generic 
immanence of the Real. Laruelle rejects any and all determinations of this kind.  
Laruelle is a non-Parmenidean, which means that the Real cannot be treated as ul-
timate reality. This is because the attempt to objectify the Real as an ultimate reality 
presupposes a dualistic difference between thought and the Real, and he denies such a 
possibility. We may therefore justifiably refer to Laruelle's position as a form of generic 
non-dualism. For Laruelle, thought and the Real constitute a non-duality (what he calls a 
"unilateral duality"), dictating that every attempt to determine the Real in terms of some 
distinguishable property is but a pipedream. Every Philosophical Decision, admittedly, 
creates the appearance of a conceptual duality between a thought-world and the Real, 
subject and object, but it is just that – an appearance. Raimon Panikkar, in his own writ-
ings, describes the problem of non-duality this way: "to ask about the ‘meaning' of a 
thing is different when asking about reality because we cannot make reality an object that 
would leave the (asking) subject outside it" (Panikkar 2008, 3). Laruelle himself de-
scribes this kind of non-dual problematic in terms of thought's radical immanence to the 
Real. 
We may understand radical immanence in terms of a phrase appropriated from 
Maurice Blondel's theology: the Real is "the beyond of thought" (Blondel quoted in Cun-
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ningham 2002, xvii-iii; emphasis original).12 This does not mean that thought has concep-
tual knowledge of what is beyond conceptualization – such a proposition would generate 
an inclosure paradox. How could thought conceptualization that which is beyond concep-
tualization? Rather, that the Real is the beyond of thought means that it is the transcen-
dental a priori from which thought necessarily thinks. The Real is given to thought "pri-
or-to-the-first" determination of what the Real is ontologically. Laruelle defines it as 
"given-without-givenness" (don sans donation). Said differently, the Real is given to 
thought without being given as being or non-being. It is presupposed without being con-
ceptually posited since it is "the presupposed, the condition" of all thought-worlds (Laru-
elle 2015c, 38; emphasis original). The Real is, therefore, strictly non-phenomenological. 
It does not appear within the confines of a thought-world, and so every attempt to deter-
mine the Real as world x comes too late because the Real is "the strictly unreflected upon 
form of truth" without any definable form or content, the generic truth prior to conceptu-
alization (Laruelle 2010d, 20). Inverting Cusanus' idea of "learned ignorance" (docta 
ignorantia), Laruelle therefore asserts that the Real is a kind of "unlearned knowledge" 
(savoir indocte). This sounds as though the Real operates like Kant's transcendental syn-
thetic a priori categories of the mind, but the Real is non-thetic. Indeed, Laruelle may be 
said to take the road abandoned by Kant insofar as the Real may be understood as the 
transcendental analytical a priori of thought, that is, the necessary condition of thought, 
which not does not add to our knowledge in any way but is the generic tautology (A = A) 
from which thought thinks (see Galloway 2014).13 In this sense, the Real is a strictly non-
conceptual form of knowledge. The implication of this is that one can articulate the tran-
scendental a priori of thought without making recourse to empirical experience, pace 
Wilfrid Sellars (see Sellars 1997). The Real is non-inferential, immediate, and transcen-
dentally prior to any determination of what it is: the bare fact that there is anything at all. 
                                                          
12 As Anthony Paul Smith comments, non-standard philosophy "is formally similar to theology. . . . 
Theology thinks from God and not of God in the same way that philosophy would think of God," 
although the critical difference is that the Real is foreclosed to authority (Smith 2013, 95, 102). This 
formal similarity is unsurprising given that non-standard philosophy operates from a post-Cantorian 
model of consistent incompleteness, and thus shares with ontotheology, despite their divergences, the 
axiom that "some truth is beyond language" (Livingston 2012, 59). 
13 The proposition that "the Real = Real" is, of course, an iteration of the "Law of Identity." But un-
like the Aristotlelian version of this idea, which states that a thing is what it is, a non-standard Law of 
Identity generically states that a thing is that it is. 
LABYRINTH Vol. 20, No. 1, Summer 2018 
 
 
 
33 
 
 
Ray Brassier, the fiercest Anglophone critic of Laruelle, dismisses non-standard 
philosophy precisely at this point, rejecting any appeal to intuition as unintelligible 
(Brassier 2012). I am sympathetic to Brassier insofar as Laruelle ties intuition specifical-
ly to the experience of the "human-in-person," though to what extent this identification is 
performative rather than decisional remains an open question. However, insofar as Brass-
ier simply denies the very possibility of non-conceptual knowledge as but a manifestation 
of Wilfrid Sellars' "myth of the given" – thereby endorsing that an experience of some-
thing is a function of the concept of that thing – this is but dogmatic assertion. The de-
mand that non-conceptual knowledge must be justified is incoherent, since if there is 
indeed such a thing as non-conceptual knowledge, it is unjustifiable, by definition, within 
the confines of conceptuality. 
Specifically, we may understand this as a "digital" dogma. As Alexander Gallo-
way defines it in his work on Laruelle, "the digital is the basic distinction that makes it 
possible to make any distinction at all" (Galloway 2014, xxix). This is another way to 
describe the assumption of conceptual dualism – that the Real (s) has some property (F) 
that makes it  distinguishable from all other things, and that F is what allows s to be an 
object of ultimate knowledge. A digital representation of s bears the information that s is 
F, and no other information but this information (not including whatever is entailed by s 
being F). By contrast, an analog representation, besides the information that s is F, bears 
additional information with it that resists digital determination or systematic recombina-
bility (Dretske 1981). We might say, then, that what makes non-standard philosophy 
"non-standard" is what makes it analog, which Galloway defines in terms of "the two 
coming together as one" (Galloway 2014, xxix). In this sense, every conceptual determi-
nation of the Real in terms of some property bears additional information – the transcen-
dental, non-conceptual knowledge of generic immanence – which is precisely what un-
derdetermines the stability of every digital, conceptual duality. Every determination of s 
in terms of F is in "excess of itself" (Laruelle 2013b, 4). The Real is thus non-conceptual 
knowledge, which resists recombinability to representation. However, it is not perceptual, 
computational, or even ontological knowledge. It is, rather, real knowledge of the nou-
menal thing-in-itself transcendentally given prior-to-the-first determination of the thing-
in-itself. Playing with a Derridean term, we might say that the unlearned knowledge of 
the Real is a real trace. And as a real trace, it describes precisely that which is the rela-
tion, which itself not relational or conceptualizable, between every-thing and its objecti-
fication as F. As "a subject for the relation of two signifiers" (Laruelle 2015c, 32), the 
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Real determines every conceptual dualism as immanent to itself "in-the-last-instance" 
(which is simply another way to refer to a thing's immanence to the Real). 
The real trace stands in opposition to how conceptual dualism operates, which op-
erates from the assumption that a reflexive procedure is possible whereby thought is able 
to obtain a transcendental viewpoint (Transcendence) by which it can conceptually de-
termine the Real, and how it can know as much. Every dualism thus operates upon a 
model of conditioned datum (the domain of experience posited through an operation of 
Closure) and its conditioning faktum (the a priori of experience posited through an oper-
ation of Transcendence), which are together posited as being the givenness of the Real as 
a whole: a synthetic unity of datum and faktum (as posited through an operation of Do-
main). Standard philosophy thus treats the Real as a "relative-absolute whole" (Laruelle 
2013b, 232), that is, the conceptual synthesis of s and F, transcendence and immanence, 
faktum and datum, ontology and epistemology. But how is such an appearance possible if 
thought is radically immanent to the Real? As the transcendental analytical a priori of 
thought, the Real is the necessary but insufficient condition of knowledge. What is there-
fore needed is a Philosophical Decision, which is the occasional cause that creates a 
thought-world. In other words, the Real is first given-without-givenness, from which then 
a "cut" is made. And it is this decisional cut – the positing of the Real as world x – that 
projects a reality, a thought-world, which then appears to stand in separation from the 
Real. It is a Decision that causes the Real to appear as a potential object of knowledge 
that has some property F that distinguishes it from other things. In this sense, the very 
distinguishability of the Real only appears in and through a Decision, that is, a Priestian 
operation of Transcendence. 
This appearance is made possible by what Laruelle refers to as the "unilateral du-
ality" of the Real, or what I refer to as the "non-duality" between the Real and thought. 
As the transcendental analytic a priori of thought from which thought thinks, the Real 
determines thought unilaterally. Unilaterality dictates that every thought-world is deter-
mined by the generic immanence of the Real without it being able to determinate the Real 
in return conceptually back. This one-way determination is why thought always comes 
"too late." Using a mixture of Laruellian and Priestian terms, we might say that from the 
"vision-in-One," that is, the purview of generic immanence, every Decision to determine 
the Real (an operation of Transcendence) is immanent to the Real in-the-last-instance 
(Closure). A Decision cannot objectify the Real successfully because the Real is precise-
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ly that which is transcendentally operational prior-to-the-first positing of the Real as 
anything whatsoever.14 
Non-duality thus signifies if the equation of the Real is the transcendental, generic 
tautology of thought (a = a), then a Decision does not add anything to the Real at all (a 
fact that be transcribed as 1 + 1 = 1).15 From within the purview of the vision-in-One, 
then, the appearance of duality is explicable precisely as just that – an appearance. As 
Brassier puts it, this duality has "only one side" (Brassier 2007, 142). Compare this to 
Raimon Panikkar's observation that the appearance of duality "is the so-called relation 
vel distinction rationis (distinction of our mind, but not objective or real). It was the 
opinion of Śankara, Thomas Aquinas, and others that the link is only real from our side" 
(Panikkar 2008, 215). In this light, we may assert that standard philosophy's conceptual 
dualism is an operation of paradoxical "auto-entrapment." For every attempt to trap (to 
determine) the Real within any given thought-world only ends up trapping philosophers 
themselves in an inclosure paradox. This includes those who would posit the Real as 
incomplete and immanent, for this very positing constitutes thinking of "immanence in 
the mode of transcendence" (Laruelle 2010b, 31; emphasis original).16 Inhabitants of a 
thought-world, insofar as they operate from the Principle of Sufficient Philosophy, trap 
themselves in inconsistency. And in this sense, we might go so far as to say that inclosure 
paradoxicality is the very essence of standard philosophy. Herein lies "the endless confu-
sion" of thought insofar as it treats the Real as an object (Laruelle in Barber, et al 2013, 
103). 
Here we come full circle to the aporia of finitude. Insofar as we are like blind men 
in the forest who have never met an elephant, we truly do not know what an elephant is. 
Insofar as are like a fly, we cannot know we are on the Sistine Chapel ceiling. Insofar as 
                                                          
14 I take this argument to be representative of what I call the "Openness Schema" (see appendix A, 
§2). 
15 This might sound like Laruelle is a monist of some indeterminate kind. This is, for instance, how 
John Milbank misreads him (Milbank 2011). However, insofar as Laruelle adheres to a kind of gener-
ic actualism, he is able to treat the plurality of thought-worlds as irreducibly pluralistic because since 
thought-worlds have been stripped of their representational sufficiency, and so bivalence no longer 
applies. Thoughts-worlds are not competing approximations of the Real, but differential spheres of 
performative actualization. 
16 This is why we may refer to models of the Real, even those that determine the Real as immanence, 
as models of transcendence (see appendix A). 
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we like a cat or dog, we cannot know the contents of the books around us. Otherwise we 
would cease to be finite. We would have taken an exit from immanence. 
 
Performance 
 
Unlike ontological dualism, non-standard philosophy operates from a position of 
non-conceptual performance. Specifically, it operates from the presupposed, non-
conceptual knowledge of the Real (Domain) and Closure (thought's radical immanence), 
while denying Transcendence (the sufficiency of thought to determine Ω). Laruelle is a 
consistently finite thinker who operates from an aesthetic rather than conceptual idiom of 
thought. Non-standard theory's consistency, is however, not logical in kind, but rigorous-
ly aesthetic and performative (cf. Ó Maoilearca 2015a, 97-140). Laruelle does what he 
says and says what he does in an open-ended performance without representing anything 
whatsoever. As performative, non-standard philosophy "exhausts itself as an immanent 
practice rather than as a programme," as he puts it (Laruelle 2003, 177). And this is be-
cause non-standard philosophy is theory that is inseparable from praxis, its content insep-
arable from form: all thoughts, as determined in-the-last-instance, are "art-thoughts" 
(Laruelle 2012b, 2). 
We may refer to non-standard aesthetics in terms of the artificialization of 
thought. Laruelle has any number of terms for referring to thought-world's artificiality, 
foremost among them, "philo-fiction" (see Laruelle 2010c), which is a term used to des-
ignate the operations of a thought-world separated from its representational sufficiency. 
Specifically, we may define a thought-world, aesthetically, as a differential sphere of 
performance. For from within the "Non-Parmenidean Equation: Practice = Thought," 
performance "and thought are identical in-the-last-instance" (Laruelle 2012c, 114-15). A 
thought-world is its performance, it is as it does, and its "what" is its "how." We might 
say therefore that insofar as all thought-worlds are comprised of philo-fictions, every 
thought-world may be understood as a kind of "art-world." For since the Real is without 
appearance or presentation, there can be no "re-presenting" it; and since there is no way 
to re-present the Real, every philo-fiction is a kind of originary presentation of the Real 
(or what Laruelle sometimes refers to as a "clone"). Of course, the fictional status of 
philo-fictions does not mean they are somehow unreal. Indeed, given that Laruelle is an 
actualist (meaning that everything that is, is actual), this tells us that all philo-fictions are 
determined as real or actual in-the-last-instance (Del Bufalo 2003). They are real con-
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structions. And what else is a "real construction" but a synonym for techné? – a technol-
ogy, a craft, an organon, an artifice. So we may say that the artificialization of thought 
dictates its operationalization – that thoughts are to be used to perform, think, and create 
in new ways.17 The Real is not an apophatic abyss, and non-standard philosophers do not 
take it as their highest vocation to stare senselessly into the opacity of immanence. Ra-
ther, non-standard philosophy is more like a cataphatic engine, that is, a means of innova-
tion by which to create new art-worlds. As Laruelle himself declares, "Invent Philoso-
phy!" (Laruelle quoted in Mullarkey 2012, 143). 
Here we may think of another elephant other than the one we met earlier in the 
parable of the blind men. This elephant comes from the Buddhist Yogācārin ph ilosopher 
Vasubandhu (c. 4th-5th). In The Twenty Verses, Vasubandhu asks us to imagine that we 
are seated at a magic show where a magician appears to make an elephant appear on 
stage. He tells us that insofar as we are unenlightened – that is, insofar as we have not 
realized the emptiness (śūnya) of the conceptual duality (Dvaya) of subject and object 
(grāhyaṃ grāhakaṃ ca) – we naively believe that world is as it appears to us. In other 
words, we believe that the magician has actually conjured up an elephant. Yet through 
training and practice, we can understand how the illusion works, and enlightenment is 
nothing else but knowing that the elephant is an illusion. However, and this is the key 
point, despite our enlightenment, it still appears as if there is an elephant on stage. Even 
after enlightenment, the appearance of conceptual duality persists – it is just that one now 
apprehends it in a non-conceptual way (see Gold 2015, 244-8). In the same way, we 
might say that insofar as art-worlds are apprehended from within the Principle of Suffi-
cient Philosophy, one believes that the elephant projected as x is the elephant in-itself. 
When one understands the hard problem of finitude, however, one suspends this Principle 
and is able to think non-dualistically, that is, according to the Real in-the-last-instance. 
Nevertheless, even after this suspension has been enacted, the appearance  of a duality 
between thought and the Real, between one's projected elephant and the elephant in-itself 
persists. But this is not a problem for non-standard philosophy because it is precisely in 
and through such illusory elephants that we think, experiment, and perform the Real in-
the-last-instance. So the goal is not to transcend the apprehension of duality, but specifi-
cally to transcend thought's supposed sufficiency to objectify the Real conceptually. In 
                                                          
17 Cf. this to Cogburn's reconstruction of OOO as a form of art, that is, "a way to make sense of things 
in new ways" (Cogburn 2017, 75). 
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this regard, the "blindness" of out finitude does not put us at distance from the Real but is 
precisely the transcendental condition for superpositioning and performing it. Here the 
"what" of reality is identical with "how" thought conceptualizes it in-the-last-instance. 
In contrast to the conceptual idiom of thought, there is no onto-logical distance be-
tween the noumenal elephant (the Real) and the phenomenal elephant (philo-fiction). 
Every art-world is a kind of "phenoumenal" performance of the Real (if one will excuse 
the neologism). Such a proposition stands in a repudiation of the Berkleyan/Fichtean 
prohibition upon thinking the unthinkable noumenal. As Laruelle declared in his well-
known debate with Jacques Derrida, non-standard theory operates "from the thing itself" 
(Derrida and Laruelle 2005; emphasis original). Fittingly, it was Derrida who proclaimed 
"there is nothing outside the text" (Derrida 1976, 158-9), which amounts to a reitera-
tion of the Berkleyan/Fichtean argument that we cannot get "behind" the phenomenal to 
the noumenal. However, if we suspend ontological duality, then what becomes clear is 
that we always already think from the thing-in-itself because every thought is a thing-in-
itself. It is phenoumenal. In this sense, we can separate the Real from ideality (logocen-
trism) while still recognizing the reality of all thoughts in-the-last-instance. We might 
even say the text is always already outside of itself. Non-standard philosophy is "not so 
much a question of breaking out of the circle," as Brassier put it in his earlier work, "as 
realizing that you were never inside it [the text] in the first place" (Brassier 2007, 129). 
Said differently, from within the vision-in-One, there is no way to distinguish the text 
(the finite, phenomenal projected elephant) and what is outside the text (the noumenal 
elephant of the Real) conceptually. We may there assert that the "problem" of an external 
noumenal reality is not truly a problem at all. It is an illusory aporia created by the pro-
cedures of standard philosophy, which creates the appearance of distance from the Real 
through an operation of Transcendence. One here could conceivably speak of non-
standard philosophy as "externalizing" the phenomenal or "internalizing" the noumenal. 
But both descriptions still operate from a kind of conceptual dualism that is inappropri-
ate, not because the difference is sublated, which is the route Hegel and German Idealism 
took, but rather because the phenomenal and the noumenal are held together in quantum 
"superposition" (see Laruelle 2010c). Superpositioning, in a basic sense, is another way 
to think of art-worlds not as approximations of the Real but as so many immanent per-
formances of the Real. For the Real is indifferent to how it is superpositioned, performed, 
or cloned through philo-fictions. It is a "weak force" (see Laruelle 2015b). And non-
standard philosophy is an alchemical means, as it were, by which to incubate and execute 
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an endless proliferation of artistic performances. As an underdetermined weak force,  the 
Real bears an illimitable series of determinations and superpositions. Here, then, it is 
noumenals materialized "all the way down," so to speak. 
We may here reinvoke our adaptation of Kant's empirical directive ("reality, what-
ever it is, is known only through its effects, and of it, apart from them, we cannot have 
any concept of reality whatsoever"). For non-standard philosophy, the question is no 
longer, "What is the Real?" but "What can the Real do?" This points toward the generi-
cally empirical attitude of non-standard theory, which motivates its users to create and 
inhabit new art-worlds, new philo-fictions, new imagined elephants by which to superpo-
sition, perform, and explore in endlessly creative ways. For if we take this empirical 
directive as axiomatic, then – to play upon Spinoza's famous dictum about the body – we 
might say we do not even know what the Real is capable of. If the Real is only knowable 
in and through its effects, then we are in the position of blind men in a forest, a fly on the 
ceiling, a cat or dog in the library who cannot determine their lack of comprehension and 
so do not even know aprioristically what the Real can do .  
This is, in so many words, what Laruelle points to as the "democracy-of-thought" 
(Laruelle 2012a), that is, an open-ended, performative conjunction and aesthetic ex-
change of art-worlds with no one in a position of royal transcendence. Here, philosophy, 
science, politics, and art converge as one, unable to be disentangled from each other in-
the-last-instance. And this is because all art-worlds are forms of rationality, experimenta-
tion, relationality, and creativity all at once. 
 
Non-Standard Religion 
 
What would it look like to run religion through the organon of non-standard phi-
losophy? Of course, Laruelle has already undertaken a number of religious experiments 
in terms of heresy, messianism, Gnosticism, and mysticism (Laruelle 2010a, 2015a, 
2015d; cf. Dubilet 2015); and others have taken up theology (Smith 2013, 2011) and 
Buddhism in their own non-standard work (Wallis, Pepper, Steingass 2013). However, in 
what follows, I offer a theory of what we may call "non-standard religion" in general, 
which runs parallel to Laruelle's account of standard philosophy. 
Let "the Sacred" be one of the first names of the Real (see n. 6). In this light, the 
axiom of non-standard religion is that all performance is transcendentally preceded by 
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and presupposes an underdetermined domain of value: "the Sacred."18 This dictates that 
all performance is immanent to the Sacred, and so is unable to determine what the Sacred 
is or how this is so. In Priestian terms, non-standard religion operates from the presuppo-
sition of Domain (the generic immanence of the Sacred) and Closure (performance 's 
immanence to the Sacred), but is foreclosed from any operation of Transcendence by 
which thought could determine the Sacred as an ultimate end.  Our project is, therefore, to 
provide an account of what the Sacred (Domain) is like from within finitude (Closure) 
such that transcendental determination of what the Sacred is (Transcendence) is explicat-
ed as both impossible and inconsistent. This would humble any attempt to treat the Sa-
cred as an ultimate telos. Such would stage usher in a "de-ultimatization" or "de-
teleologization" of sacrality, for the Sacred is precisely that which is prior-to-the-first 
determination of itself as a goal. Or, said differently, it is the real trace anterior to every 
determination of the Sacred. 
"Standard religion," if we may use the term, is classifiable as a species of concep-
tual dualism, specifically, a type of teleological dualism. Teleological dualism operates 
from the following assumption: that the Sacred (s) has some property (F) that makes it 
distinguishable from all other ends, and that F determines s as an object of ultimate 
achievement. The assumption here is that performance can realize the Sacred as an end 
(telos) through practice (pragma). We may describe this idea in terms of "the Principle of 
Sufficient Hierophany" (as derived from Eliade's term, "hierophany": an appearance of 
something sacred). This Principle states that both that the Sacred is a goal and that per-
formance is able to realize that goal through some posited way of life. The implication of 
this principle is that thought is able to obtain a dualistic distance by which to represent 
the Sacred as an object of realization for performance. We may refer to this as the "Pla-
                                                          
18 The term, "the Sacred," derives from combination of the work of Mircea Eliade and Ann Taves. 
Specifically, the Sacred is an intentional (and therefore not necessarily existent) object of ultimate 
value correlated to human consciousness, both apprehended through, and ascribed to, various things 
(Eliade 1969, i; Taves 2009, 16-55; cf. Rennie 2017). Here I offer a non-phenomenological and non-
ascriptive reinterpretation of this term through a non-standard mutation of Eliade's philosophy of 
religion. I am of one accord with Bryan Rennie's sentiment that if Eliade "expressed a coherent under-
standing of religion which allows for sacrality to be identified with the ascription of reality without 
involving the assumption of autonomy, without defining sacrality in terms of a supernatural and 
independent ontology, he has surely made a contribution to the history of religions" (Rennie 2017:9). 
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tonic" heart of standard religion. Here Nietzsche's reconstruction of Plato is illuminating: 
"The real world, attainable to the wise, the pious, the virtuous man – he dwells in it, he is 
it. (Oldest form of the idea, relatively sensible, simple, convincing. Transcription of the 
proposition ‘I, Plato, am the truth.')" (Nietzsche 2003, 50; emphasis original). The as-
sumption here is that there is a pre-established harmony, or isomorphism, between teleol-
ogy and sacrality, which dictates that the Sacred is the realizable goal of performance.  
In order to put the Principle of Sufficient Hierophany into action, a "Hierophanic 
Decision" is required. The Principle states that, in principle, the Sacred is given as a goal 
whereas a Decision states what that goal (the telos) is specifically given as and how that 
goal is realizable (the pragma) in order to achieve what we may generically refer to as a 
"maximally beneficial" way of life, such as enlightenment, salvation, etc. Givenness, as 
we have already seen, is a phenomenological term, which signifies that the operative 
assumption of standard religion is that the Sacred appears, that is, that the Sacred gives 
itself as hierophany X, Y, or Z. Specifically, the Sacred appears teleologically: either as 
the purpose of life (as in ontotheology) or the purposelessness of life (as in meontotheol-
ogy, that is, nihilism). In this sense, standard religion – as well as its mirror, "standard 
secularism" – operates from a model of teleological rivalry, for regardless of whether one 
treats the Sacred as an ultimate purpose (ontotheology) or ultimate purposelessness (me-
ontotheology), one operates from the assumption that the Sacred is given as a goal, or the 
negation thereof. Teleological rivalry is the constitutive structure of both standard reli-
gion and secularism in that they both operate from the assumption that religions are so 
many spheres of representation and performance competing to conceptualize and achieve 
the one true maximally beneficial form of life. 
As opposed to standard religion, let us explore a non-Platonic model of the Sacred. 
Here the Sacred would not be determined as an ultimate end. This is because the attempt 
to objectify the Sacred as an ultimate end presupposes a dualistic difference between 
performance and the Sacred, which is inconsistent. Why? Let us take the Sacred as the 
generic immanence that is transcendentally prior to its objectification as an ultimate end. 
We may define the Sacred, then as the transcendental analytic a priori of performance, 
that is, the generic tautology (a = a) from which we think and performs. In this sense, the 
Sacred, strictly speaking, is a form of non-conceptual knowledge, which we can articulate 
as a transcendental a priori of performance without making recourse to any experience, 
including even religious or mystical experience. Specifically, the Sacred is given-
without-givenness, that is, given to thought and performance prior-to-the-first objectifica-
LABYRINTH Vol. 20, No. 1, Summer 2018 
 
 
 
42 
 
 
tion of the Sacred as an ultimate end (that is, as the ultimate purpose or purposelessness 
of life). From the within the vision-in-One, therefore, the Sacred does not appear. It is 
not a hierophany. It is, rather, the non-inferential, immediate given that transcendentally 
draws performance into action prior-to-the-first-determination of goal-making. The Sa-
cred is that which always already lures thought into a performative aim, whether that aim 
is spontaneous or sustained, near or far, great or small. Prior to any conceptual determi-
nation, we may describe the Sacred precisely as the transcendental analytic a priori of 
performance.19 
As the transcendental analytical a priori of performance, the Sacred may be de-
fined as the necessary but insufficient condition for goal-making. The Sacred is transcen-
dentally given-without-givenness, and only thereafter posited as goal X, Y, or Z. For in 
order to make a goal, a Hierophanic Decision is required. A Hierophanic Decision may 
be defined as the occasional cause that makes a teleological formation, a differential 
sphere of performance, possible. Every differential sphere of performance constitutes a 
kind of cut from the generic immanence of the Sacred, which conceptualizes the apparent 
separation of "what is" from "what should be." Mutating Eliadean terms, teleological 
dualism operates in terms of a conditioning/conditioned schema whereby the conditioned 
datum (the profane plane of experience as posited through an operation of Closure) and 
its conditioning faktum (the Sacred as posited through an operation of Transcendence) 
are posited together as the givenness of the Sacred as a whole: the synthetic unity of the 
Sacred and the profane (the Domain). Here the Sacred and profane, problem and solution, 
diagnosis, etiology, prognosis, and treatment plan are all posited simultaneously. The 
Sacred and its opposite, the profane, are a single package deal (cf. Eliade 1959, 10). In 
Priestian terms, standard religion may be said to operate from the assumption that an 
operation of Transcendence, whether brought about by human or superhuman autonomy 
(or some combination thereof), can be effected by which to reveal the Sacred as an ulti-
mate goal realizable through religious performance. In other words, the assumption is 
that either adherents of standard religion can obtain a transcendental viewpoint (Tran-
scendence) by which they can determine the teleology of the Sacred (Ω) or that the Sa-
cred (God, Being, Brahman, etc.) reveals and determines itself through a hierophanic 
operation of Transcendence. Either way, the knowledge and realization of the Sacred as 
                                                          
19 In the language of Jorge Ferrer's participatory approach to transpersonal phenomena, we refer to the 
Sacred as the undetermined mystery of reality (see Ferrer 2017). One might helpfully contextualize 
my project here within the "participatory turn" (see Ferrer 2008; cf. Allison 2017). 
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ultimate end is made possible. Here we may mimic Laruelle and propose that adherents 
of standard religion may be said to project an ultimate end for themselves, which is to 
say, one that has been constructed in the realm of operational transcendence, within 
which they claim to intervene, and in terms of which they gauge all possible interven-
tions. 
This operation of Transcendence is inconsistent, however, given that the Sacred is 
precisely that which unilaterally determines performance in-the-last-instance. This dic-
tates that thought is unable to determine the Sacred as an ultimate end of performance. 
Because from within the vision-in-One, every attempt to turn the Sacred into a realizable 
end of performance overlooks the fact that the Sacred is transcendentally prior to every 
teleological determination. Mutating Laruelle, Priest, and Eliade together, we can say that 
from the vision-in-One, every conceptualization of the Sacred (the operation of Tran-
scendence) is in fact transcendentally immanent to the Sacred (the presupposed Domain) 
in-the-last-instance (Closure). In other words, thought is unable to determine the Sacred 
as an object of realization, because every performance is immanent to the Sacred to begin 
with. This we can understand that every Hierophanic Decision, every posited end, is only 
apparent and relative to the differential sphere of performance itself created through that 
Decision.20 This appearance is possible due to the non-dualistic relationship between the 
Sacred and performance, whereby the Sacred unilaterally determines every performance 
as sacred in-the-last-instance. And this fact dictates that every determination of the Sa-
cred as an ultimate end is one-sided, nothing but another occasion of the relation vel 
distinction rationis (distinction of our mind, but not ultimate in-the-last-instance). We 
may now assert, then, that since all religious worlds are immanent to the Sacred, we are 
all unable to objectify the Sacred from the outside. We are always already performing it 
prior to our conceptualization of it, and so are unable to determinate what it is. Per for-
mance is suspended in an axiological openness whose boundaries it is unable to demar-
cate, and any attempt to determine them reinstates the basic aporia of finitude. For inso-
far as thought posits the Sacred as religious world x to which it is supposedly immanent, 
this very positing constitutes an inconsistent operation of Transcendence by which 
thought both is and is not contained within world x conceptually. 
                                                          
20 Every Decision serves a differential function existentially and politically. As Eliade puts it, we 
formulate hierarchies of values in order to make sense of, or "cosmicize" the Real, into the religious 
worlds we then inhabit (Eliade 1982, 201). 
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However, if we go way of non-standard religion, then we are free to bypass this 
aporia through the suspension of both the Principles of Sufficient Philosophy and Hiero-
phany and their decisional operations.21 Insofar as we recognize the unilateral determina-
tion of performance by the Sacred, we are free to treat every Hierophanic Decision in a 
religiously pluralistic way. Religions are so many "hiero-fictions" – a proposition that 
signifies the artificialization of religion.22 Here, therefore, we may invoke Eliade, who 
declares, "no ‘form' [of the Sacred] is exempt from degradation and decay, no ‘history ' is 
final" (Eliade 2004, xxiv). Mutated through non-standard religion, this declaration not 
only undermines any standard form of exclusivism, inclusivism, or pluralism, it also 
dictates that there can be no such thing, definitionally, as an ultimate end. Moreover, and 
as Eliade writes, "we cannot be sure that there is anything… that has not at some time in 
human history been somewhere transformed into a hierophany" (Eliade 1996, 11); or as 
he put it elsewhere, "the Sacred is manifest in an infinity of forms" (Eliade 1960, 353). In 
other words, because there can be no such thing as an ultimate end, the Sacred is precise-
ly that which allows for an infinite proliferation of hiero-fictions, none of which is suffi-
cient to determine it in-the-last-instance. The Sacred is infinitely performable. The Sa-
cred allows for an illimitable number of axioms. 
If we begin from the axiom that all of us are like blind men in a forest, flies on a 
ceiling, or cats and dogs in a library, then we do not and cannot know what the Sacred is, 
or even what it would mean for something to be the "ultimate" end of existence. Because 
from within non-standard forms of religion, we no longer ask "what is the Sacred?" or 
"Which religion is true?" We rather ask, "What can the Sacred do?" To adapt our revised 
empirical directive to religion, we might say that the Sacred, whatever it is, is known 
through its effects, and of it, apart from them, we cannot have any concept of sacrality. 
What constitutes a maximally beneficial form of life is no longer a dogmatic given, but 
an open and empirical question. 
To think the Sacred from within finitude: such would usher in a democracy-of-
thought, a democracy-of-religions, or, even better, a "parliament of religions" (with a nod 
                                                          
21 A certain history of philosophy and religion would be possible through narrating the relationship 
between these two principles in terms of their dual-operationalization (ontotheology), the suspension 
of religion's sufficiency in favor of philosophy's sufficiency (secularism, atheism, materialism), or 
vice versa (as in various forms of Christian orthodoxy (see Adams 2014; Hart 2004); or their dual-
suspension. The history of such dual-suspensions has yet to be written. 
22 As Peter Sloterdijk suggests, religions are "anthropotechnics," that is, technologies of the human 
being (Sloterdijk 2013). 
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to the 1893 Chicago World's Fair). For the formation of such a parliament of religions 
would initiate a true scientia sacra, as if for the first time. And such a science would be 
pluralistic, open-ended, empirical, performative, and democratic (cf. Blake 2016). 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is one of the great ironies of post-metaphysical thinking that in attempting to re-
ject a transcendental viewpoint, it so often ends up with royal knowledge anyway. This is 
because to know the boundaries of immanence, one would have to know where imma-
nence ends and transcendence begins. But how could one ever determine the boundaries 
of immanence from within the vision-in-One? We thus find ourselves suspended in this 
indeterminate, open interval between the finite and a limit we cannot comprehend, caught 
up in the creation of art-worlds from which we design and enact an endless supplementa-
tion of non-dualistic thought and performance without finality. Of course, this does not 
mean that we cannot make, or have not made, progress in knowledge. Relative, finite 
progress is always possible empirically and ethically. It is rather the idea of ultimate 
progress that has been rendered unintelligible.23 We might again say that the limits of 
thought are boundaries that cannot be crossed, but we do not even know what they are. 
And since we do not know the limits of the thought, we do not even know what the Sa-
cred is capable of. Organized research programs into the Sacred are needed. 
It therefore becomes imperative to think pluralistically and non-dualistically, that 
is, to think generically. For it is, finally, only a rigorously generic thought of the infinite, 
which would be able to approach the infinite freed from the authority of both philosophy 
and religion – an infinity that we could never conquer through conceptualization or 
achievement, but requires open-ended experimentation. And such a thought of the infinite 
that dictates the incompleteness of the finite.24 We never find closure on the Real or the 
Sacred. And why would we want to? If indeed our goal is not to transcend the apprehen-
sion of duality, but specifically to transcend the apparent sufficiency of thought to con-
ceptualize infinity, then non-standard religion may be understood as an apparatus of the 
                                                          
23 In order to account for how such progress from within non-standard theory, the relationship be-
tween art and truth would need to be explicated (see Graham 1996).  
24 A generic infinity is closest to Cusanus' model of the infinite in that, unlike the Scotist-Cartesian 
lineage's treatment of infinity as a "clear and distinct idea," it is a rigorously finite and purely negative 
concept. 
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impossible: the site of unending production for thought and performance. As Vasubandhu 
insists, after enlightenment, the appearance of duality persists. Conceptuality is not the 
enemy, but a conventional tool to be understood.  
We always already finds ourselves within the finite, unable to determine the infi-
nite. However, this should not drive us to overcome this indeterminancy and so fall into 
an inclosure paradox, but rather to embrace endless art-making: an "open doxa" of per-
formance that is more "musical" than it is dialectical. We may understand this process of 
art-making as a kind of empirical mysticism, a mysticism that cannot be separated from 
philosophy, science, politics, or art. For sacrality cannot be separated from the designing 
of art-worlds, and every art-world is a site of rationality, experimentation, relationality, 
and creation In this sense, we might say such empirical mysticism is the very means of 
our own self-creation and becoming. For in the end, a non-standard procedure is nothing 
else but an asceticism – a "divinely artificial art" (Nietzsche 2010, 37). And so we offer a 
closing imperative: invent future religion! 
 
 
John Matthew Allison, M.Div, Princeton Theological Seminary,  
allisojm[at]gmail.com 
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Appendix A: Inclosure and Openness Schemas 
 
1. Inclosure Schema (see Priest 2002, 156): 
 
(1) Ω = {y; φ(y)} exists and ψ(Ω)                  Existence 
(2) if x ⊂ Ω and ψ(x)      (a) δ(x) not-∈   x    Transcendence 
                                        (b) δ(x) ∈ Ω            Closure 
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Figure 1. Inclosure Schema 
 
 
 
2. Non-standard Philosophy's Openness Schema25 
 
The Real (Ω) is immanence (y) given-without-givenness (φ), as in φ(y). Non-standard philos-
ophers think according-to the Real, meaning the Ω is non-conceptual and thus undetermined, 
as in ψ(Ω). Let us posit x, the domain of thought, which is taken as a subset of Ω, and that 
ψ(x). Together, ψ(Ω) and ψ(x) make up the axiomatic basis of non-standard philosophy. Next, 
let us apply an operator, δ (a Philosophical Decision) to x, which conceptualize Ω specifically 
in terms of F. However, insofar as x  Ω, then δ(x) is immanent to the undetermined limits of 
both x and Ω in-the-last-instance. Thus non-standard philosophy is constituted by an "open 
doxa" of performance that is aesthetically consistent and incomplete. 
 
(1)  Ω = {y | φ(y)} is given and ψ(Ω)  Domain 
(2) if x  Ω and ψ(x)          (a) δ(x)  Ω              Closure 
             (b) δ(Ω)  Ω Closure 
 
Figure 2. Openness Schema 
 
 
                                                          
25 Cf. Gangle 2014. Elsewhere Gangle proposes that "diagrams are the appropriate method for inves-
tigating immanence immanently" (Gangle 2016, 2). 
